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n June 2005, debt relief was, once again, high on the agenda of international politics. The G8 summit, chaired by the UK government, passed a plan to cut the debt of a group of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC). Politicians and part of the press hailed this decision as a historical step.
1 Indeed, the heads of government of the leading industrialised countries agreed to reduce the foreign debt of 18 developing countries by around US$ 40 billion.
Arguments in Favour of Debt Relief
With this step, the heads of government gave in to ever louder calls for debt relief, which came from a large group of NGOs, individuals and government organisations. The arguments in favour of debt relief, cited over and over again by this group, are straightforward. The text of a fl yer of the German ministry of economic cooperation and development serves as a typical example: "Why debt relief? Debt is one of the most severe obstacles in the fi ght against poverty. For decades, high levels of debt have constrained development in the poorest countries … The consequences are the extreme poverty of large parts of the population and an increasing indebtedness of the state. The countries in question enter a debt trap: overdue payments are increasing and interest plus interest on interest are piling up … In many of the poorest countries, debt has reached such high levels that governments have to spend more on servicing debt than on education and health combined." 2 It is important to note that the "burden of debt" is understood not just as a fi nancial burden but as a real burden. As the argument goes, developing countries have to commit real resources to service foreign debt -real resources that cannot be used within the country. Debt relief would free these resources for internal use.
3 In this way, the situation of the population in these countries could be substantially improved.
Sceptics, however, point out that debt relief may provide perverse incentives. Countries that have used funds ineffi ciently are rewarded. In the present study, we do not want to review the pros and cons of debt relief. 4 Rather, we focus on the question whether foreign debt does, in fact, entail a real burden. In order to tackle this question, we analyse the balances of payments of a group of highly indebted countries -focussing on those sub-balances that mirror real exchanges with the rest of the world, i.e. the balance of trade and services and the "non-interest current account".
"Burden of Debt": Different Concepts
If the burden of foreign debt is interpreted as a transfer of real resources to the rest of the world, it can be determined from balance of payments fi gures. 1989, International Monetary Fund, pp. 242 ; and P. K r u g m a n : Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, in: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1988, pp. 253-268 Intuitively, a fi rst port of call could be data on international payments of interest and re-payments. These payment fl ows are booked in the income account. The fi gures are diffi cult to interpret, however. They may refl ect actual payment fl ows. But it is also possible that no payment has been made. According to the accounting principles of the IMF, overdue interest payments are booked as interest received. Simultaneously, the amount of debt is increased. Thus, balance of payments statistics may contain high fi gures under "interest payments made" although, effectively, no payments have been made.
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Given this accounting practice, it is sensible to focus on real fl ows of goods and services. Such a focus is also preferable because the supporters of debt reduction focus on the real burden of debt.
The fl ow of goods and services is recorded in the balance on trade and services. An outfl ow of real resources implies that more goods are sold to the rest of the world than purchased from the rest of the world. Thus, a net outfl ow corresponds to a surplus in the balance on trade and services. If, on the other hand, a country experiences defi cits in the balance on trade and services, it is a net receiver of real resources from the rest of the world. Thus, when interpreting the burden of debt as a real burden, the balance on trade and services can be used as a measure.
It could be argued that the balance on trade and services is too narrow an indicator of the burden of debt. For instance, if foreign aid cannot be employed to foster development but has to be used to pay interest, there also exists a kind of real burden. Suppose a country receives US$ 50 million in aid payments. However, it can only fi nance a resource infl ow of US$ 20 million with this aid money because it has to spend US$ 30 million on debt service. In this case, it could be argued that there is a real burden in spite of the resource infl ow. This burden consists of the difference between the aid fl ow and the infl ow of resources. When this defi nition is used, the correct indicator of the burden of debt would be the "non-interest current account" (cf. Figure 1) .
The non-interest current account is derived from the balance on trade and services by adding current transfers (mainly aid and cross-border income payments).
A surplus on the non-interest current account implies that export income and net foreign aid have not been completely used to fi nance a real resource infl ow (imports). In the absence of private capital fl ows, it shows to what extent a highly indebted country has used its own export income or aid received to service its foreign debt.
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A defi cit in the balance on trade and services or the non-interest current account implies that a country has experienced a net infl ow of real resources from the rest of the world. Thus, the claim of the board of advisers to the German ministry of economic cooperation and development, that current account defi cits are a prime reason for the continuing problems of highly indebted countries, seems debatable.
7 These defi cits are a refl ection of foreign aid in the form of current transfers and concessional loans. Without this aid (and the corresponding defi cits) these countries would be worse off.
Data Problems
The present study is based on balance of payments statistics published by the IMF. One cannot expect these fi gures to be 100% correct. A glance at aggregated fi gures for the world as a whole illustrates this point. For the world as a whole, exports should equal imports. However, in the early 1990s a large gap emerged reaching US$120 billion in the peak year (cf. Figure 2 ). This may not be as bad as it looks. After all, it was equal to less than 2% of the total of world exports.
Unfortunately, the aggregate fi gures may paint too rosy a picture. An IMF analysis from 1995 shows that statistical errors sometimes become larger if 6 Of course, the funds may also have been used to fi nance capital exports. Thus, both the balance on trade and services and the noninterest current account measure the upper limit of the real burden of debt. Assuming that capital exports (other than repayments) and reserve account changes are zero.
one moves to sub-balances of the current account. Moreover, it is not unlikely that fi gures in the group of highly indebted countries are less accurate than, say, in OECD countries. Thus, balance of payment fi gures for this group have to be interpreted with caution.
However, given that our results unambiguously point in one direction and would even hold after drastic data revisions, the data problem does not seem to affect the basic results. Moreover, there seems to be some evidence that errors in balance of payments statistics are partly off-setting (cf. Table 1 ). Thus, there are sound reasons to underestimate import values (in the case of import duties) as well as overstate them (in the case of restrictions on capital exports). A similar argument can be made for the export side.
Empirical Results
The two burden concepts introduced above form the basis of the following empirical analysis which focuses on the group of HIPCs as defi ned by the IMF and covers the period from 1974 to 2004. 8 However, of the entire group of 38 HIPCs there are only 25 countries for which data are available for most of the period.
9 For a group of 10 countries, there are only data for about 50% of the past 15 years. 10 For three countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), no balance of payments data have been published. 8 A critical discussion of the HIPC-Initiative can be found in P. H j e r t h o l m : Analytical History of Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Debt Sustainability Targets, Development Economics Research Group (DERG) Working Paper, 1999, http://www.econ.ku.dk/derg/papers/DSTHisto-marts99.pdf. 9 Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. Figure 3 provides an overview of aggregate balance of payments data for the group as a whole. The pattern that emerges is typical for most of the individual countries. The HIPCs as a group have experienced annual net infl ows of goods and services of about 7.5% of GDP, on average. As Figure 3 shows, this infl ow has been somewhat lower in the 1970s and 1980s -rising to 8-10% in the 1990s. Even when focussing on the non-interest current account, there is a small surplus in only 3 years -implying that, at most, a small fraction of foreign aid had to be used to service foreign debt (or fi nance capital exports). So, even if a wide defi nition of the burden of debt is used, there is no indication of a real burden of debt. In almost the entire period, debt service has been completely fi nanced by capital imports. Some of these capital imports may consist of "true" capital fl ows (market borrowing) but it seems likely that a large part simply refl ects re-scheduling of debt repayments and interest payments.
The analysis of aggregate data may mask large differences at the level of individual countries. However, as far as it is possible to judge from the incomplete data, the results also hold for most of the countries individually. 21 of the analysed 35 countries are characterised by persistently high defi cits of the balance on trade and services.
11 This fi nding refutes the argument that highly indebted countries suffer an outfl ow of resources due to high debt service. Even when looking at the non-interest current account, only a few countries exhibit small surpluses for one or two years.
A second group of countries (Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Sudan), experienced a surplus on the balance on goods and services and/or the non-interest 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 current account in three or more years. 12 But even for these countries, the net outfl ow of real resources was small in comparison with the net infl ow during the deficit years. Ghana is a typical example of this group (cf. Figure 4 ). 29 countries of the group of HIPCs have seen an almost continuous resource infl ow over the past 30 years. Six countries, however, have experienced outfl ows for a number of years. Gambia and Zambia, for instance, experienced sustained surpluses on the non-interest current account. A group of four countries -Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Myanmar -experienced periods of sustained trade surpluses. Thus, for these countries, debt service may have meant a real burden. Consequently, for these countries, debt forgiveness might free resources for investment and the fi ght against poverty.
Conclusions
Sub-balances of the current account can be used to measure whether and to what extent foreign debt really poses a real burden for a country. Depending on how "burden" is defi ned, the balance on trade and services or the non-interest current account can be used. Looking at both balances for the past 30 years, a clear result emerges: HIPCs have been net receivers of goods and services for almost the entire period under study. Debt service almost never implied an outfl ow of real resources.
While somewhat reassuring, this result has a sobering implication: debt forgiveness will hardly have any real impact at all. This results looks surprising at fi rst. However, it can be easily explained. Most of the HIPCs 12 Bolivia, for instance, saw high export surpluses in the fi rst part of the 1980s that were used to fi nance debt service on market loans.
have not made any real effort to service their debts. Therefore, debt forgiveness also does not imply any real reduction of the debt burden.
Given the results of this study it is surprising that the German ministry of economic cooperation and development is proclaiming that debt forgiveness has had tangible results: "In the group of 26 countries that profit from debt relief, expenditure on schools, social and health institutions has been rising signifi cantly. Before debt relief, these countries jointly spent about US$ 5.8 billion on social improvements. Today, this fi gure has risen to US$ 9.1 billion annually." 13 Whatever factor has been the cause of this rise in social spending, it cannot possibly have been the reduction in the real burden of debt. Possibly, the conditions that came with debt relief (increased investment in health and education) played a role. It remains to be seen whether these changes will have a lasting impact.
On the whole, the debt forgiveness announced by G8 governments is far less "historical" than donor countries wish us to believe. Basically, donor countries are writing off debt that had no more value anyway. However, this move may enhance the credibility of development policy by ending the endless chain of crisis meetings and debt re-scheduling. In the future, donor countries should be more concerned with the ability and willingness to repay loans. In the case of the very poor countries, they should consider moving from loans to grants. In this way, at least transparency would be improved. 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 percentage of GNI Balance on Goods and Services Non-interest Current Account 
